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ABSTRACT 
Tittle of Dissertation: Vessel Traffic Service as a Maritime Security Tool: Vessel 
Traffic Management Information Systems (VTMIS) in Ghana 
Degree: MSc 
The dissertation is an assessment of the role of the VTMIS in enhancing efforts to bring 
down maritime security in the threats in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa focusing on 
Ghana. 
According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS) is implemented by a Competent Authority to improve the safety and efficiency of 
vessel traffic and to protect the environment. Technological development today has led 
to significant improvements in vessel traffic service. Vessel Traffic Management 
Information Service is the integration of Management information systems to improve 
the quality of vessel traffic services. Vessel traffic services essentially are used for 
information services, navigational assistance services, traffic organisation services, and 
similar allied services. Increasingly, threats to maritime safety and security in the Gulf of 
Guinea area are becoming major issues in the world.  This study investigated the role of 
the VTMIS in Ghana in enhancing and combating maritime security threat such as 
piracy, smuggling and trafficking, in the Gulf of Guinea area. The study collected 
primary qualitative data from respondents from agencies in Ghana that uses information 
from the VTMIS for the assessment.  It also relied on secondary data from the IMO and 
Ghana Maritime Authority on incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The study 
revealed that VTMIS in Ghana contributes significantly to security of offshore 
installations in Ghana. It also reveal that Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in 
monitoring and reporting maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea area. 
KEYWORDS: Assessment, Vessel Traffic Service, Maritime Safety and Security, Gulf 
of Guinea, Offshore installations 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study  
Maritime security is an integral to the success of the worldwide maritime transportation 
chain. Major threats to maritime security include terrorism, unlawful acts such as piracy 
and arm robbery at sea, smuggling of migrants and drugs, threats to resource security, 
and environmental threats such as pollution incidents and illegal dumping (Ameri and 
Shewchuk, 2007). Maritime Security is therefore the combination of preventive and 
responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats and intentional 
unlawful acts (Feldt, Roell, and Thiel, 2013). According to researchers such as Ameri 
and Shewchuk (2007), maritime security and safety are complimentary concepts with 
common objectives. Feldt et at. (2013, p1) stated that “maritime safety is the 
combination of preventive and responsive measures intended to protect the maritime 
domain against, and limit the effect of, accidental or natural danger, harm, and damage 
to the environment, risks or loss.”  
Both security and safety have been major areas of concern to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and the international community. The International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 has provided standard guidelines for 
enhancing maritime security. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US) a 
comprehensive set of measures contained in the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) were developed to enhance the security of ships and port 
facilities (International Maritime Organization, 2015). The adoption of Resolution 
A.578 (14) ‘guidelines for vessel traffic services’ by the IMO was also focused on 
preventing maritime disasters and protecting the marine environment (International 
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Association of Marine Aids, 2012). The original guidelines for vessel traffic services 
were revised and adopted in 1997 as Resolution A.857 (20). IMO defined Vessel traffic 
service (VTS) in this new resolution as “a service implemented by a Competent 
Authority, designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect 
the environment” (International Maritime Organization, 1997, p.3).  
The purpose of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to provide active monitoring and 
navigational advice for vessels in busy waterways (United States Coast Guard, 2015). 
According to the European Commission (2008) VTS systems are intended to ensure 
maritime safety in particular areas of dense shipping. The IMO identifies three 
categories of services provided by VTS systems including information services, traffic 
organization services, and navigational assistance services (International Maritime 
Organization, 1997). VTS systems consist of land based control centers that receive 
information from sensors such as radar, Automatic Identification System (AIS) and 
closed circuit television (CCTV) (European Commission, 2008). Some VTS systems 
also integrate Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) data centers to enable 
them identify and track ships globally. VTS installations therefore provide valuable 
surveillance information on offshore infrastructures such as oilrigs, seabed cables, and 
pipelines. According to the European Commission’s report, VTS systems include 
mechanisms for tracking, receiving and reporting distress messages from vessels and 
therefore help in fighting maritime crime. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs report released in 2013, piracy, 
armed robbery at sea, and illegal fishing are on the ascendency in the Gulf of Guinea 
(GoG) area. There have been collaborative actions by coastal countries in West Africa 
to reverse the situation in order to ensure the security of maritime activities in the GoG 
Region. However, although VTS is recognized as a valuable security information tool, 
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its establishment in many countries is very slow. One major factor accounting for this is 
due to the fact that there has not been much empirical assessment of its role in 
enhancing maritime security. Using the Vessel Traffic Management and Information 
System (VTMIS) in Ghana as basis, the main objective of this study is to discuss the 
role of VTS in enhancing maritime security in the GoG Region. This thesis will identify 
both weaknesses and strengths of VTS in enhancing maritime security. Anyiam (2014, 
p12) recommended “GoG states must invest in modern technology in their efforts to 
combat maritime crime.” He argued that VTS systems equipped with AIS and LRIT 
“could be useful for purposes of maritime security surveillance.” The potency of this 
recommendation will be tested in this thesis.   
1.3 Research Objective  
To assess the role of VTS in enhancing maritime security in the GoG area and work 
specifically to:  
1. To investigate how VTS can contribute to the increase of security level of 
offshore installations ( pipe lines, oil rigs, cables etc) 
2. To access how VTS capabilities are integrated in the effort to fight against crime 
in the GoG.  
3. To identity short falls in it use and propose ways to overcome. 
1.4 Research Questions  
1. How can VTS be used to provide security monitoring of offshore installations? 
2. How can VTS be integrated in the effort against crime in the GoG?  
3. What are the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool and how can they be 
removed?  
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1.5 Significance of Study 
West Africa is identified as part of the prone areas of maritime piracy in the 
contemporary era. Most of the reported incidents in the GoG are violent actions for the 
purpose of stealing. Although most unlawful acts against vessels in the GoG are 
erroneously reported, there is general consensus that the rate of such unlawful acts is on 
the increase in recent years  (Anyiam, 2014). Anyiam’s report stated that between 1995 
and 2014, about 843 incidents of acts considered unlawful against vessels were 
reported.  This study is significant because it will help understand how VTS can 
contribute in the reduction of unlawful acts against vessels in the GoG. It will also 
source of information to researchers and pave the way for future research in the area of 
VTS in the GoG region.  
1.6 Scope, Limitation and delimitation 
The scope of study is limited to the use of VTS in maritime security areas such as 
unlawful acts against vessels and protection of offshore infrastructure. The IMO 
resolution (A857 (20)) that provides the guidelines for vessel traffic services identifies 
three categories of services provided by VTS systems. These include information 
services, traffic organization services, and navigational assistance services. Primarily, 
the VTMIS in Ghana is being used as an information service tool and aid to maritime 
Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. This therefore defined the focus of the study to 
assess how VTMIS is used in the fight against maritime crime. If other countries like 
Nigeria, Liberia, and Ivory Coast had VTMIS systems the scope of the study could have 
been broader. However, Ghana is the only country with a VTS system in the GoG 
region presently. The study would therefore relay on information solely from Ghana’s 
VTS operations for the analysis.  
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1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The study is divided into five chapters. In chapter one the background and research 
problem is presented. In this chapter, the relationship between VTS and maritime 
security and safety is also discussed as well as the research problem and objectives. The 
justifications for the research and limitations have also been discussed. In Chapter Two, 
the research methods were discussed. Included in this chapter is a discussion on the 
sources of data, qualitative research method, targeted group, sampling technique, and 
ethical issues. The reasons for choice of qualitative method and choice of sampling 
techniques will be explained. Chapter Three reviewed related literature on VTS and 
maritime security and safety. The review focused on the use of VTS in protecting 
offshore installations and in fighting crime. In addition, literature on the shortfalls of 
VTS in achieving maritime security was reviewed. This helped identify the gaps in 
literature on maritime security and safety and VTMIS to be addressed.  The fourth 
Chapter discussed qualitative data collected. The discussions are themed under the sub 
objectives of the study. Chapter Five will present a summary of the results in Chapter 
Four. It will also state the findings of the study and recommendations for policy makers 
and future studies.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
RESEARCH METHODS 
 2.1 Sources of Data 
Data will be collected from both primary and secondary sources for the study. Primary 
data is first hand information for a particular investigation. According to Currie (2015, 
p.89) “primary data are data that were previously unknown and which have been 
obtained directly by the researcher for a particular research project.” According to 
ACAPS (2012, p.3); “primary data is most generally understood as data gathered from 
the information source and which has not undergone analysis before being included in 
the needs assessment. Primary data is collected directly from the affected population by 
the assessment team through field work.” On the other hand, secondary data refers to 
data collected by other researchers that already exist in the literature (University of 
Surrey, 2014). According to ACAPS, “secondary data is information which has 
typically been collected by researchers not involved in the current assessment and has 
undergone at least one layer of analysis prior to inclusion in the needs assessment. 
Secondary data can comprise published research, internet materials, media reports, and 
data which has been cleaned, analysed and collected for a purpose other than the need 
assessment, such as academic research or an agency or sector specific monitoring 
reports.” This was used in the review of literature for finding gaps that needed answers. 
It provided useful information and serve as a source of historical data on VTS and 
maritime security in the GoG.  
Particularly, the following secondary data was used in the investigation: reports on 
VTMIS by GMA, The IALA publications, Hart (2014), Professors Dalaklis, Siousiouras 
and Nikitakos (2009), and the International Maritime Organization, (2015). GISIS: 
Piracy and armed robbery. Materials on procedures, equipment, and other 
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documentation on VTS from IALA will. The information from Professors Dalaklis, 
Siousiouras and Nikitakos (2009) on the advantages of VTMIS in Greece was compared 
with the VTMIS in Ghana to identify similarities and differences. The data from the 
International Maritime Organization (2015) online database on the regional statistics on 
unlawful acts such as piracy and armed robbery and other related crimes served as 
guided information in the discussion of results. The IMO’s data together with Hart 
(2014) reviews on trends in maritime crime in the GoG was used in understanding the 
nature of maritime security threats in the region.  
2.2 Research Method 
In every investigation, the choice of a particular method (or methods) is a very 
important decision because it affects the results of the entire research. The kind of data 
that we need determines how we should go about collecting it and what methods we 
should adopt (Currie, 2015). ACAPS (2012) stated that “qualitative research explores 
information from the perspective of both groups and individuals and generates case 
studies and summaries rather than lists of numeric data.” Upon careful evaluation of the 
nature of the topic the qualitative research method was therefore employed in gathering 
first primary data. Parkinson and Drislane (2011) defined qualitative research as the 
type that uses methods such as participant observation or case studies which result in a 
narrative or descriptive account of a setting or practice. Such data are often textual 
observations that portray attitudes, perceptions or intentions. Qualitative research has 
also been defined as research that uses data that do not indicate ordinal values (Guest, 
Namey, and Mitchell, 2013). Whereas quantitative research focuses on how many and 
how much, qualitative data answer questions of how and why events of phenomena 
exist.  
According to the University of Surrey, 2014 the benefits of the qualitative approach is 
that the information is richer and has a deeper insight into the phenomenon under study. 
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Research in maritime security requires detailed data. However, in many cases this 
information is often classified coupled with the fact that VTS systems are equipped with 
high tech devices that gather data for analysis and use. As stated by Guest, Namey, and 
Mitchell (2013), the advantage of qualitative research is the ability to probe into 
responses and observations as needed and obtain more detailed descriptions and 
explanations of experiences. Patton and Cochran (2002) added that when it comes to 
face validity, the qualitative data acquisition process provides an additional advantage. 
Another advantage of the qualitative approach is that it explores relationships and 
perceptions held by affected persons and communities. Consequently, smaller sample 
sizes chosen purposefully is advantageous because “some informants are more likely to 
provide greater insight and understanding of a disaster’s impact to the assessment team, 
due to a variety of factors including their social, economic, educational, and cultural 
position in the community” (ACAPS, 2012, p.8). At this early stage of the VTMIS 
phase in Ghana a research method that allows careful consideration of participants 
would yield better results than when someone is selected at random to answer a 
qualitative question. This research method was able to collect rich and detailed 
information in a limited time and resources.  
2.3 Research Participants  
According to ACAPS (2012, p.11) key informant interviews provide vital information 
on individual perspectives and experiences through direct discussion. The reports 
defined a key informant, as a person with prior knowledge of the issues in a community 
who can provide information on behalf of the community on the impact of such issues 
and on the priority community needs. It added questions meant for key informant seek 
to explore the impact of the issue on the community as a whole. The data collected can 
be combined and analysed to develop an understanding of how for example “an issue 
has affected different (sub) groups of a population, why it has so affected them, and 
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what their ensuing priority needs and concerns are and are likely to be over time.” This 
research was done primarily with key informants from varies state agencies that uses 
the VTMIS in Ghana.  
The Ghana Maritime Authority is the state agency responsible for maritime 
administration; this agency established and operates the VTMIS in Ghana. Nonetheless 
other stakeholders in the maritime industry in the country are given monitoring stations 
to aid them in their operations. In order to collect information from different 
perspectives and experiences, two participants where interviewed from the GMA and 
the other state agencies including the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, Narcotics 
Control Board, Fisheries Department, Immigration Service, and, Ghana Navy, as well 
as the  Customs and Preventive Service. The participants were selected to answer 
questions sent via email, Google docs forms, and or interviewed on phone.   
 
2.4 Interview Procedure  
Interviews are the central technique in qualitative inquires because it allows complexity 
of process to be captured with just a handful of individuals (Moayoux, 2011; Patton and 
Cochran, 2002).  This study used in-depth interview technique in acquiring data from 
the participants. Open-ended interview offers the interviewer the ability to ask question 
in different ways and from different angles. These help the participants to understand 
the issues of the study and offer rich data for the researcher. ACAPS (2012, p.3)  
“primary data is most often collected through face to face interviews or discussions with 
members of the affected community, but can also be gathered through phone interviews, 
radio communication, email exchange, and direct observation.”  
On the forms that were sent via email or Google docs to participants, excerpts from the 
consent form that introduced the research to the participants preceded the interview 
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questions. During the introduction, participants were also told that all the information 
collected for the study would be treated with confidentiality.  Participants were first 
asked to state the name of their organisation. In the Google Form this was set as a 
“required” response. This action was necessary to differentiate the government agencies 
that they belong. This will also guide in the interpretation of their responses, because 
the different agencies used the information from the VTMIS to meet their own 
operations.   
Apart from the introduction, the main investigation was structured into fourteen 
questions. The interviews questions were carefully designed to cover the objectives of 
the study. The study intended to investigate how VTS can contribute to the increase 
security level of offshore installations; to access how VTS capabilities are integrated in 
the effort to reduce maritime crime in the GoG; and identity short falls of the system. 
The questions that were used for the interviews are discussed in detail bellow.  
 
What is your background?  
The first question was required to understand the participant’s background, work 
experience, current job specification and expertise. Their shared experience brought 
about an understanding and appreciation of their response to questions. 
Could you take me through the general set-up of the VTS system in Ghana? (in terms 
of infrastructure). 
The second interview question was meant to understand whether, the participants who 
were drawn from agencies in Ghana had adequate knowledge about how the VTMIS 
was set-up. Although this question was meant to test their understanding of the physical 
set-up in terms of infrastructure and network, it is understood that these are very 
technical issues and only staff from GMA could answer it in a satisfactory manner. So 
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for other participants outside of GMA, mere understanding of the departments that were 
linkup as well as the source of the information was considered as enough.  
What are the usefulness of the VTMIS to Ghana and the West African sub-region? 
Question three, was formulated to test general theoretical knowledge of the possible 
uses of VTMIS in Ghana and West African region. Respondents general knowledge 
helped understand how they are using the system now and how they could use it in the 
future.  This contributed information to answering the second sub-objective. 
 Are there other government agencies that benefit from the VTMIS? (If so list them 
and the nature of information they receive from VTMIS) 
This was linked up to the knowledge of general usefulness of VTMIS. The system 
integrated government agencies in the maritime sector to share vessel traffic 
information for purposes of safety, planning and prevention of crime in the maritime 
domain. The question will help understand the various agencies linked up in the VTMIS 
and the kind of information deemed useful to that agencies.  
 Are there targeted areas during VTMIS operations? i.e.: (Restricted zones, or areas 
where pipeline are laid) 
This question was targeted at the GMA respondents to know whether during operations 
they monitor certain restricted zone in Ghana’s waters. Focus areas including areas 
demarcated as areas to be avoided, pipelines, other state protected areas, zones where 
fishing is not allowed etc. This question helped to investigate the first sub-objective of 
the study.  
What are the communication mediums used in the VTMIS to contact and 
communicate with vessels and between VTS centres?  
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Question six intended to list the various options available in the system for establishing 
communication via voice (audio) and text to vessel. It also included medium on which 
internal communication between VTS centres and monitoring stations are done. This 
brought understanding as to what assistance the VTMIS could offer to vessels such as in 
time of distress. The options available and how effective they are partly determines how 
reliable the VTMIS is.      
How far in terms of nautical miles is the coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS? 
The coverage area of the system is also important. This question helped to identify the 
different devices that fed data into the VTMIS and how far in nautical miles the coast of 
Ghana was covered. This would help to understand whether the system could identify 
unlawful acts in the areas away from the coastline and the territorial waters.  
How can VTS be used to provide security monitoring of offshore installations? 
This question intended to find out how VTS is used in practical terms to monitor state 
and private infrastructure along the coast of Ghana. The answers brought about 
information on how it is used currently, and how it can be improved in the future to 
enhance maritime security.  
What is the role of VTMIS in ensuring maritime security?  
The question was meant to test the roles Ghana’s VTMIS is playing in preventing and 
combating maritime security threats along the GoG specifically within the nations’ 
maritime domain.  Respondent’s views on maritime security were different, so the 
definition adopted in the literature was applied to issues listed. Maritime security 
includes a wide variety of issues. The study adopted (Bueger, 2014) semiotics concept 
of defining maritime security. This looks at how maritime security relates to other 
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concepts such as maritime safety, blue economy, and human resilience. This question 
directly answered sub-objective two. 
How can VTS be integrated in the fight against crime in the GoG?  
Sub-objective two, intended “to access how VTS capabilities are integrated in the effort 
to fight against crime in the GoG.” This question solicited respondents’ views on the 
role the system is playing in fighting unlawful acts or maritime crime.   
What are the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool and how can they be 
removed? What are the limitations in the use of VTS as a monitoring tool?  
Questions eleven and twelve, were intended to identify the short falls in the use of 
VTMIS in Ghana since the facilities installation. They questions directly correlate to the 
third specific objective.  
What are the training requirements for VTS staff? (Qualifications) 
This was designed to understand whether the training requirements for VTMIS 
personnel were in accordance with IMO regulations and IALA requirements.  
Are there regulations that VTMIS authorities are expected to comply? (If so list and 
explain them) 
Installation and operation of VTMIS must be done in accordance with IMO SOLAS 
convention chapter V regulation 12. This question tested whether the management was 
done in accordance with such regulations.   
2.5 Data collection Process   
Telephone calls were made to the participants to establish contact for interview and 
days to be arranged. The respondent were humbly asked whether they would prefer to 
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be interviewed on phone, receive email with the questions, or receive a link that would 
lead them to Google Docs for the interview.  
  
2.6 Limitation 
The study adopted a definition of maritime security to help delineate the boundaries of 
maritime crime. Bueger’s proposed semiotics concept suited the needs of the study 
except that one of the concepts of projecting seapower at sea was not covered in this 
study. Relating maritime security to seapower is deemed beyond the scope of the study. 
Embracing a definition of maritime security based on seapower would invariably 
include other agencies even as the Navy. Since much of the information is classified, 
the study excluded all maritime security threats dealing with defense. Maritime security 
was only related by semiotics to maritime safety, blue-economy, and human resilience. 
This prevented the study from examining how VTMIS can assist in combating maritime 
threats such as arms proliferation, terrorist acts, interstate dispute or corporation which 
indeed qualified as maritime crime issues.  
Bueger’s semiotics concepts eventually led to his design of the Maritime Security 
Matrix (MSM). The MSM allows for the study of the types of relations established by 
different actors between maritime security and other concepts and provides bases for 
scrutinizing what actors include and exclude in their concept of maritime security. 
However, a weakness is that interpretations of threats can differ remarkably. What 
constitutes piracy for example is a matter of debate. Although IMO data on unlawful 
acts in the GoG indicated that the over 80% of the acts considered as piracy in the GoG 
should be treated as crimes with maritime jurisdictions, they are often reported as acts 
of piracy. The lists of threats or maritime crimes identified were subject to these 
differences.  
 15 
Limited data on other identified threat of maritime security such as smuggling, 
pollution, unlawful and unregulated fishing, and human trafficking. Only data on piracy 
and armed robbery was readily available on IMO websites and in (Hurt, 2014). 
 
2.7 Ethical issues   
Ethical and data protection issues are very critical for all researchers. The University of 
Surrey (2014) stated that ethical principles seek to work towards protecting the 
participants, communities and environments involved in the studies against any form of 
harm, manipulation or malpractice. In essence, the three major principles of ethics that 
every research should address include informed consent, confidentiality and avoiding 
harm.  This study will seek consent of every participant and allow him or her to 
withdraw from the interviews at any point they wish to do so. All data acquired was 
treated with confidentiality. Interviews were also done in professional manner to protect 
participants from any harm.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Maritime Transportation serves about 90 percent of global trade (Allianz Global 
Corporate, 2014).  Shipping therefore plays a vital role in the export and import of 
goods in the world (International Chamber of Shipping, 2013). Technological 
innovations and developments in the maritime industry have affected shipping and both 
high sea and near the coastline fishing. There has been a transition from wind and 
manual powered fishing vessels to mechanized steam vessels. According to Professors 
Dalaklis and Siousioura, (2009, p.2), reliable electronic devices help in precise position 
determination of vessel at sea. They added that automatic devices installed in ship’s 
bridges play significant roles in reducing to possibility of maritime accidents due to 
technical errors and that “such innovation can be considered as a major contributor to 
the solution of the rising transport challenges.” Sewell, Jefferson, and Oakley (2006, p1) 
noted that improvements in innovation have  “enabled fishing vessels to tow larger, 
heavier gear, resulting in higher catches.”  
However, a number of negative consequences have come with the increased 
international shipping and fishing. On maritime accident for example Professors 
(Siousiouras and Dalaklis, 2009, p.2) stated that, “they started with the very first efforts 
to conquer and tame the seas and the oceans and even today, in the so called “digital 
era”, maritime disasters or mishaps appear rather frequent in the news.” A total of 228 
lives were lost between 2011 and 2013 around European Union (EU) waters due to 
maritime accidents (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2014). Maritime accidents 
leads to serious injuries or loss of life, damage to ships, material damage, pollution, and 
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damage to the environment. With regards to the increment in catches, Sewell et al. 
(2006) noted that this comes at the risk of greater environmental damage.  
According to (Prof. Siousiouras and Prof. Dalaklis, 2009) “providing guidance from 
ashore to a vessel underway is quite often necessary in order to avoid unpleasant 
mishaps at sea, such as a collision or grounding.” Implementing a VTS helps in 
identifying and monitoring vessels. Additionally, it enhances provision of navigational 
information and assistance to vessels and can assist in prevention of pollution as well as 
coordination of pollution response (International Maritime Organization, 1997). The 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter V, Regulation 
12 sets legislative requirements for governments that intend to establish VTS to aid 
navigation and enhance maritime safety. IMO Resolution A857 (20) adopted in 1997 on 
the “Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)” also contains guidelines for operating 
a VTS. This chapter reviews literature on the use of VTS by selected group of nations to 
aid in safety of navigation and security in the maritime domain. The essential 
components of a VTS system are discussed. Maritime security statistics in the Gulf of 
Guinea (GoG) area is reviewed.  The current chapter also reviews the roles VTS can 
play in maritime security in the GoG area.   
3.2 Development of Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)   
Maritime transportation has always been the backbone for world commerce. From the 
days of early voyages in the Arabian sea to the Roman expansion of trade routes in the 
Mediterranean Sea; from the Arabian age of discovery in the 7
th
 century to the time the 
compass was invented in China in the 11
th
 century; from the European age of discovery 
in the 15
th
 century to modern maritime shipping in the 19
th
 and 21
st
  centuries, people 
have wanted to explore what was beyond the sea (Rodrigue, Comtois, and Slack, 2006).  
Not just the desire to transport goods, but also the need for safe and efficient voyages 
have been major concerns in maritime transportation.  
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To this end, “authorities throughout the world have provided aids to navigation in and 
around their coastal waters” (International Association of Marine Aids, 2012, p16). 
According to the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and 
Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) VTS Manual 2012, the earliest aids to navigation were 
mostly shore-side beacons and lights, followed by the introduction of buoys. With time, 
these aids were improved upon and audible signals were added. In the 1940s, vessel 
traffic increased in major ports of Europe. Coupled with bad weather conditions, port 
operations were disrupted as serious traffic congestions resulted.  
This meant that a new approach was needed to help decongest vessel traffic in ports as 
well as enhance safety of navigation. IALA VTS Manual states that the best option at 
the time was to use shore-based radar combined with communications components to 
monitor maritime traffic. Thus in combination with VHF radio, a traffic surveillance 
system was achieved and real time information exchange between the shore and ships 
became possible. The first radar based Port Control station was established in Douglas, 
Isle of Man in 1948, however the radar set installed in the Port of Liverpool later the 
same year is regarded as the pioneer of the modem VTS system (Ustaoglu and Furusho, 
2014). Shore based radar controls gradually spread out and became common in most 
major European and North American ports and harbors in 1960s and in Asia in early 
1970s (International Association of Marine Aids, 2012; Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014). 
As shore based radars were being explored as aids to navigations, a series of maritime 
disasters including the Exxon Valdez, Torrey Canyon, Meluta and Amoco Cadiz 
stretching from 1960 to 1980s increased concerns for safety in shipping and protection 
of maritime environment. IALA pointed out that various researchers put forward the 
idea that the use of simple vessel traffic management would increase operational hours 
resulting in better utilisation of a port’s capacity and has reduced the number of 
maritime accidents. Therefore in the wake of these disasters, radar surveillance and 
vessel traffic managements system were introduced in numerous ports.   
 19 
3.3 IMO Guidelines for Operating VTS 
However, in these early days when it become clear that radar aided traffic management 
was the way forward, port authorities, pilots, and shipmasters debated on the 
navigational regulatory system that must be used. Because there was no agreement 
among these stakeholders, then it was a fact that a form of international harmonization 
was needed on this new radar surveillance and aid system. According to Bowditch 
(2002, p387), the “consequences of collision or grounding for modern ship carrying 
tremendous quantities of high-value, perhaps dangerous cargo are so severe that 
authorities have instituted many types of regulations and control systems to minimize 
the chances of loss.” He added that the regulations often concern navigation, 
communications, equipment, procedures, personnel, and many other aspects of ship 
management. Just like navigation, which was once independent throughout the world 
and later regulated by the IMO, reregulating VTS was a sure way to ensure uniformity 
in different regions and among different stakeholders.    
The then Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) now the 
IMO, examined and published Resolution A.158 “Port Advisory Services” adopted by 
the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in its seventeenth session. The resolution had 
two main recommendations. The resolution recommended to governments that they: 
firstly, consider setting up VTS services in ports and their approaches that warrant it by 
the importance and nature of traffic. (This was recommended particularly for oil 
terminals and ports where noxious or hazardous cargoes are loaded and unloaded).  
Secondly, the resolution also recommended governments to instruct masters, to help 
improve safety, by early notification of appropriate authorities of expected times of 
arrival (International Maritime Organisation, 1968). Following this, the IMO in 1985 
adopted Resolution A.578 (14) Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service.  
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Bowditch (2002) explained that these guidelines contained in A.578 (14) recognized 
that the level of safety and efficiency in the movement of maritime traffic within a VTS 
service area is dependent upon close cooperation between VTS authority and 
participating vessels. The guidelines also recognized that different operational 
procedures would likely cause confusion to masters of vessels moving from one VTS 
area to another. Broadly, Resolution A.578 (14) addressed operation procedures and 
planning a VTS. Nonetheless, the guidelines failed to resolve a number of issues. 
According to the International Association of Marine Aids (2012), the guidelines did 
not address issues on liability or responsibility which needed consideration by the VTS 
authorities. The report maintained that, guidelines also failed to create new rights to 
enact legislation on the requirements for shipping. In addition, guidelines on 
recruitment as well as requirements on qualifications and training of VTS personnel 
were also left out. To address the issues left out, the IMO revised the original resolution 
and adopted a new Resolution A.857 (20) “Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services” in 
1997 which is still in force. According to Bowditch latest publication which includes 
two important annexes, namely, Guidelines and Criteria for VTS and Guidelines on 
Recruitment, Qualifications and Training of VTS Operators.  
3.4  IMO Legislation on VTS 
The major legislative instrument on VTS in the IMO is the Safety of Life At Sea 
(SOLAS) Convention. Chapter V “Safety of Navigation” of the SOLAS convention 
amended in 2000 contains regulation on the establishment of VTS by member parties. 
Particularly, Regulation 11, “Ship Reporting Systems” and Regulation 12, “Vessel 
Traffic Services” list requirements necessary for the operation of a VTS. Regulation 11 
was devoted to guidelines for governments and shipmaster on adopting and 
implementing ship reporting system, to ensure safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency 
of navigation and protection of the marine environment. Regulation 12 extensively, 
outlined requirements for contracting governments that intend to establish VTS 
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systems. It is divided into five paragraphs as quoted following. The paragraphs in the 
Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention, Chapter V, Regulation 12: Vessel Traffic 
Services are: 
1. Vessel traffic services (VTS) contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and 
efficiency of navigation and protection of the marine environment, adjacent 
shore areas, work sites and offshore installations from possible adverse effects 
of maritime traffic.  
2. Contracting Governments undertake to arrange for the establishment of VTS 
where, in their opinion, the volume of traffic or the degree of risk justifies such 
services.  
3. Contracting Governments planning and implementing VTS shall, wherever 
possible, follow the guidelines developed by the Organization. The use of VTS 
may only be made mandatory in sea areas within the territorial seas of a coastal 
State.  
4. Contracting Governments shall endeavour to secure the participation in, and 
compliance with, the provisions of vessel traffic services by ships entitled to fly 
their flag.  
5. Nothing in this regulation or the guidelines adopted by the Organization shall 
prejudice the rights and duties of Governments under international law or the 
legal regimes of straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea 
lanes  
Source: Lloyd’s Register 2005, p.469 
Regulation 12, explains that, the overall purpose of VTS’s to protect human life, 
enhance navigation, and protect the environment. It provides the requirement to 
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establish and operate a VTS to the discretion of government and advises parties to 
arrange to provide VTS service when the volume of vessel traffic as well as the risk in 
navigation justifies such services.  The regulation points contracting governments to the 
Resolution A.857(20) “Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services” as a major guide to 
establishment. Nonetheless, it categorically noted that both the requirements in SOLAS 
and Resolution A.857(20) “shall prejudice the rights and duties of Governments under 
international law or the legal regimes of straits used for international navigation and 
archipelagic sea lanes” (Lloyd’s Register, 2005, p.462). This means that governments 
should be mindful for example of the legal implications of accidents cause by VTS 
instructions. Whilst the IMO publishes guidelines such as those given in Resolution 
A.857 (20), it is this portion of the SOLAS convention that is the most important with 
respect to VST (Huges, 2009). 
3.5 Definitions and Clarifications of VTS Terms 
There are quite a number of terminologies defined by the IMO in Resolution A.857 (20) 
that are examined in this study. The terms most used and require definition in this study 
include Vessel Traffic Service, Competent Authority, VTS authority, VTS area, VTS 
centre, VTS operator, and VTS service.  The definitions of these terminologies are 
adopted from IMO, Resolution A.857 (20). The International Maritime Organization 
(1997, p.3) defines the following; 
Vessel traffic service (VTS):  a service implemented by a Competent Authority, 
designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the 
environment. The service should have the capability to interact with the traffic 
and to respond to traffic situations developing in the VTS area”  
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Competent authority: the authority made responsible, in whole or in part, by the 
Government for safety, including environmental safety, and efficiency of vessel 
traffic and the protection of the environment.  
VTS authority: the authority with responsibility for the management, operation 
and co-ordination of the VTS, interaction with participating vessels and the safe 
and effective provision of the service.  
VTS area: the delineated, formally declared service area of the VTS. A VTS 
area may be subdivided in sub-areas or sectors.  
VTS centre: the centre from which the VTS is operated. Each sub-area of the 
VTS may have its own sub-centre.  
VTS operator: an appropriately qualified person performing one or more tasks 
contributing to the services of the VTS.   
VTS services: VTS should comprise at least an information service and may 
also include others, such as a navigational assistance service or a traffic 
organization service, or both, defined as follows:  
An information service is a service to ensure that essential information becomes 
available in time for on-board navigational decision-making.                                                  
A navigational assistance service is a service to assist on-board navigational 
decision-making and to monitor its effects.  
A traffic organization service is a service to prevent the development of 
dangerous maritime traffic situations and to provide for the safe and efficient 
movement of vessel traffic within the VTS area.  
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In many jurisdictions such as Ghana, a Competent authority also is the VTS authority. 
Ghana Maritime Authority is the state agency regulating the maritime industry and 
ensuring protection of maritime environment. In this study the two are used to refer to 
the same authority.  The VTS area, centre, and operators are discussed later under 
Ghana’s VTS. A VTS can provide all the three services defined above or at least one. 
Ghana’s system proves information service and navigational assistance service. 
Another important aspect that needs clarification is the naming system used in regions 
where VTSs are established. According to Ustaoglu and Furusho (2014) although VTS 
is the only acronym that has been officially defined by the IMO, one can see various 
acronyms such as Vessel Traffic Information Services/System (VTIS), Vessel Traffic 
Management Services/System (VTMS), Vessel Traffic Management and Information 
Services/System (VTMIS), Vessel Traffic Control (VTC), Marine Traffic Control 
(MTC). To a large extent these difference are due to the political regime of the VTS 
area, capability of VTS elements, objectives of the Competent Authority among others. 
With these differences there is a high probability that there would be functional 
differences. For this study, VTS and VTMIS acronyms will mostly be used through out. 
A VTMIS is regarded as an extension of VTS. In a very simplistic description, it is an 
information system that stores data generated from VTS for processing and sharing 
among many departments.  
A VTMIS provides greater level of situational awareness because it is an integrated 
maritime surveillance system that has multiple sensors and communication services. 
According to Bowditch (2002), VTS is only part of a larger and much more 
comprehensive information exchange system called VTMIS. He also argues that, under 
VTMIS “not only can vessel traffic be managed from the standpoint of navigation 
safety and efficiency, but also tugs, pilots, line handlers, inter- modal shipping 
operators, port authorities, customs and immigration, law enforcement, and disaster 
response agencies and others can use vessel transit information to enhance the delivery 
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of their services.” Shelter International (2015) added on this that VTMIS is an 
integration of a VTS generated data to a Management Information System (MIS). Thus 
the MIS part is the system that hold intelligent processing capabilities of information 
passed on by the VTS or fed directly into a database. Ghana’s VTMIS system provides 
both VTS services and MIS data for government agencies.   
3.6 Essential Components of a VTS System  
As mentioned in the previous sections, in the early days only VTS personnel and radars 
formed the core of VTS’ but as time went on and new innovations and technologies 
emerged, other information gathering and communication tools were added. According 
to Kop (as cited in Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014) the components of a basic VTS system 
can be categorized into four parts namely hardware, staff, training and procedures. In 
the same report Ustaoglu and Furusho also cited Wiersma et. al., that another 
categorization group the components into three; people, hardware and procedures. The 
three-component-model of people, hardware, and procedures is adopted in this study 
because training needs of staff can be discussed under personnel category.   
According to the (International Association of Marine Aids, 2013), the people 
component, include VTS operators, supervisors, and managers. Operators work in VTS 
centres controlling traffic in the port or on approach whilst supervisors supervises and 
ensure that operations within a VTS centre conform to standards set by the VTS 
authority. VTS Managers manages and coordinates the activities of the VTS centre or 
centres on behalf of the VTS Authority. Training of VTS personnel is based on the 
recommended format of IALA. Training course 103 contains detail recommendations 
on training of VTS personnel. According to IALA, VTS Operators are trained by the 
model course V-103/1 whilst Supervisors must have V-103/2. Apart from these, IALA 
maintains that, certificated VTS personnel should receive On-the-Job Training (V-103/3 
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VTS). Personnel are expected to maintain certification by refresher training and 
revalidation.  
Sources: Created by the author, based on an integration of the VTS model proposed by 
Wiersma et.al (as cited in Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014) and VTS components described 
in IALA VTS manual 2012. 
Figure 1: Three-component-model of VTS 
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The second component of the three-component-model is procedures. International 
Association of Marine Aids (2011) noted that procedures should form an integral part of 
a verifiable safety management system for the VTS. IALA recommends VTS 
authorities to develop operational procedures because collection and dissemination of 
information involves internal and external communications.  Procedures for running a 
VTS centre include the operation of systems and sensors, interactions among staff and 
the internal data processing in routine and emergency cases are seen as internal 
procedures. However, procedures that govern the interaction with participating vessels 
are considered as external procedures.  
The third component of the three-component-model is hardware. VTS hardware all 
started with a simple radar but professors (Siousiouras and Dalaklis, 2009, p2) stated 
that “new technologies and especially the further exploitation of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as traffic management systems can provide 
new and more comfortable services to passengers, increase safety and security and 
reduce the associated with traffic environmental impacts.” VTS equipment today 
comprises communication equipment, radar, AIS, CCTV, hydrological sensors, weather 
sensors, and VTS data system. The uses of that are associated with a particular VTS 
would determine what hardware is integrated. Perhaps in the case of modern VTS and 
VTMIS, another important subcomponent under hardware is software. This is used to 
manipulate and control the hardware give better meaning to the data received.    
3.7 Vessel Traffic Management and Information Services/System (VTMIS) 
A VTMIS extends beyond the components of a VTS with the addition of a MIS 
element. VTMIS process data from VTS equipment and makes it available for decision-
making.  The model in Figure 2, illustrates components of a basic VTMIS. Data from 
sensors such as radars and AIS are fed into the VTS centre and such information is 
communicated in a form of VTS service to vessels for navigational safety. The VTMIS 
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database centre also pulls information from the VTS centre and process it. Port 
authorities, Navy, Coast Guard department, SAR units, Maritime authorities, Policy 
makers, etc can be served with the information to aid them in planning. VTMIS also can 
be connected to Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) data centres for 
collecting maritime security-related information (European Commission, 2006).  This 
system enables global identification and tracking of ships. LRIT communicates 
information on the identity of the ship and its position and allow Flag States to track 
ships under its flag everywhere in the world. The hardware component discussed under 
VTS in VTMIS is integrated with software under VTMIS. 
 Source: Adopted from Shelter International, 2015 
Figure 2: Components of a VTMIS    
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3.8 Definition of Maritime Security  
According to Bueger (2014), today countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), United 
States of America (US), and organizations such as the European Union (EU), African 
Union, (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the MSC of IMO, all 
include maritime security in their list of task. However, there is no agreed definition of 
maritime security in the literature. Often, discussions loosely define it as the absence of 
threats such as maritime inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, arms 
proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents that prevail in 
the maritime domain. This approach has not been satisfactory since it does neither 
prioritize issues, nor provides clues of how these issues are interlinked, nor outlines 
how these threats can be addressed, not to talk of the puzzles over which threats to add 
to the list. The meanings attached to maritime security will always vary; to cope with 
this multi vocabulary Bueger proposed three frameworks, by semiotics, securitization, 
and security practice theory. Semiotics maps different meanings of maritime security by 
exploring the relations between it and other concepts whist securitization framework 
provides the means to understand how different threats are included in maritime 
security. To Bueger, security practice theory takes a closer look at the actions that are 
undertaken in the name of maritime security in trying to understand the concept.  
This study adopts one of Bueger’s proposed frameworks “semiotics” to help define and 
understand the nature of maritime security in the GoG area. According to Bueger (2014, 
p.160) “in semiotic thinking the meaning of a term can be grasped by exploring the 
relations of the term to others.” He further explained that in the case of maritime 
security, at least four concepts require consideration: seapower, marine safety, blue 
economy, and human resilience. A matrix of these four concepts and how they relate to 
maritime security is shown on Figure 3.  
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Source: Bueger, 2014, p.161 
Figure 3: Maritime Security Matrix  
Seapower include concepts such as a nation’s comprehensive power and maritime 
strategy, advanced maritime technology, command of the sea, sea denial, and naval 
power. It relates to maritime security in areas of national security in the maritime 
domain and inter-state disputes. According to Bueger, firmly based in a traditionalist 
understanding of national security as the protection of the survival of states, seapower 
aims at laying out the role of state naval forces and at elaborating strategies for their use 
in the maritime domain. Naval forces are one of the major actors in maritime security 
and concerns have always been for state forces should act outside their territorial waters, 
engage in other regions than their own and have a presence in international waters.  
Fransas, Nieminen, Salokorpi, and Rytkonen (2012) defined maritime safety as “the 
combination of preventive measures intended to protect the maritime domain against, 
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and limit the effect of accidental or natural danger, harms, damage to environment, risk 
or loss.” According to Bueger (2014), maritime safety “in the first place implies the 
regulation of the construction of vessels and maritime installations, the regular control 
of their safety procedures as well as the education of maritime professionals in 
complying with regulations.” Efforts at ensuring safety of ships and maritime 
installations are aimed towards protecting maritime professionals and the marine 
environment. According to Bueger, maritime safety concerns are core to maritime 
security given that it may involve environmental and cultural interests. This is also 
because the maritime industry is potential target of pirates, terrorists, trafficking of 
persons, illicit goods, and weapons.  
Shipping, fishing, and offshore resources such as crude oil play significant roles in 
many economies today; coastal tourism is also important.  Bueger (2014, p.161) argues 
that the commercial value of oceans “blue-economy” has been re-evaluated because of 
these contributions. Blue economy has seen significant endorsement in the world and 
efforts have been made at “linking and integrating the different dimensions of the 
economic development of the oceans and constructing sustainable management 
strategies for these.”   
Burger also supports that human security is the fourth concept necessary for 
understanding maritime security. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
first proposed human security as an alternative concept for understanding national 
security. Burger noted that “core dimensions of human security concern food, shelter, 
sustainable livelihoods and safe employment.” The sea is a major source of food, 
livelihood, and employment to many in less developed countries. In effect Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major concern to human security. Issues 
such as security of seafarers and vulnerability of coastal populations to maritime threats 
are but few in this list. According to Bueger (2014, p.161), “notably the resilience of 
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coastal populations has been identified as a key factor in the emergence of maritime 
threats and is hence vital in their prevention.”  
Having reviewed the relationship of these four concepts and maritime security, Bueger 
(2014, p.161), concluded that “the semiotic perspective implies that for understanding 
what meaning actors subscribe to maritime security we can study the relations they 
suggest to those other concepts.” Projected graphically, Bueger built a Maritime 
Security Matrix (MSM) (refer to Figure 3) that showed the relations between the 
concepts in ideal typical terms. Maritime security takes central place in the matrix and 
different issues of maritime security are plotted as they relate to seapower, maritime 
safety, blue economy, and human resilience.  One of the advantages of working with the 
MSM is that it allows for the study of the types of relations established by different 
actors between maritime security and other concepts. It also provides bases for 
scrutinizing what actors include and exclude in their concept of maritime security. 
However, a weakness is that interpretations of threats can differ remarkably.  
According to Bueger (2014, p.161), the MSM is an:  
“Ideal-typical version which reflects how the author would relate the concepts to 
one another. It is important to note that drawing on the matrix does not imply 
starting out from any idealized understanding and to argue that maritime 
security should integrate all of the four other concepts. The matrix is an 
analytical tool to grasp the differences and commonalities of understandings of 
different actors.” 
The choice of which of the four concepts of seapower, maritime safety, blue economy, 
and human resilience in Bueger’s “Semiotics” concept in defining maritime security 
varies. Bueger believes that this is because security actors significantly diverge over 
how they draw these relations and position threats within them. He stated that whereas 
 33 
maritime security strategies of some international organizations and countries such as 
the EU and the UK have strong relations to all four concepts and argue for a 
comprehensive approach that emphasizes the connectivity of the issues, others such as 
NATO and the African Union (AU) focuses on only some aspects of the MSM. He 
states that, NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy “excludes the lower, left corner from its 
understanding of maritime security in arguing that these are separate so called high end 
tasks, and then primarily focuses on issues related to the blue economy and human 
resilience” (Bueger, 2014, p.162).   By contrast Bueger noted that, the African 
Integrated Maritime Strategy of the AU “centers on the blue economy and argues that 
maritime security challenges are primarily relevant because they hamper economic 
growth. Starting out from the upper right corner the AU quite surprisingly excludes 
traditional considerations of interstate dispute or state rivalry from its strategy.”    
In applying the MSM of Bueger, this study defined maritime security as it relates to 
maritime safety, blue economy and human resilience. Since this study focuses on the 
use of VTS in enhancing maritime security, the seapower aspect is deemed beyond the 
scope of the study. Embracing a definition of maritime security based on seapower 
would invariably include such agencies as the Navy, and other national agencies.  This 
would take the focus of the study out of context. Therefore the first concept in Bueger’s 
proposal for understanding maritime security by semiotics is not covered in this study. 
In effect maritime security is used in this study unless otherwise stated to refer to the 
presence of issues such as maritime accidents, pollution, smuggling, piracy, robbery, 
IUU fishing, and human trafficking, in the GoG. These maritime security threats are 
also collectively called crime in this study. The focus is on the role VTMIS play in 
fighting these and other maritime threats that relates to maritime safety, blue economy, 
and human resilience.   
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3.9 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) 
The GoG area is located in West Africa stretching to the North-Western and South-
Western parts of the African continent.  The definition of the GoG region shall be 
restricted to the area in 10° South to 30° North by 30° West to 15° East as adopted in 
(Greidanus, Alvarez, Eriksen, & Barbas, 2013), see map in Figure 4. There are more 
than 15 countries in this region by reference is made especially to the coastal countries 
who directly deal with issues of maritime security in the GoG area.  
 Sources: Greidanus, Alvarez, Eriksen, & Barbas, 2013, p.10 
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Sources: Anyiam, 2014, p2.  
Figure 4: Maps of West Africa indicating the Gulf of Guinea area  
Reviewing ship traffic distributions and statistics in the narrower GoG area by 
Greidanus and others, shows a significant vessel density of 7,000 ships visible by AIS 
in the area during 6 months. Their study found that “whereas density maps show that 
cargo ships and oil tankers normally follow the major maritime traffic routes across the 
Atlantic Ocean and along the coast of Africa, the position reports from the fishing fleet 
shows high concentrations on the fishing grounds as well as how the fishing areas 
change seasonally” (Greidanus, et. al, 2013, p.55). This density comes with significant 
maritime security threats in the area. According to Schembri (2012), the lack of any 
maritime security strategy amongst the 15-member Economic Community of West 
Africa States (ECOWAS) is having a significant effect across the region where 
maritime criminal activity is on the rise. The report noted that the GoG area is home to 
maritime security threats such as transnational organised crime, including oil bunkering, 
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robbery at sea, hostage taking, human and drug trafficking. According to professor 
(Dalaklis, 2012, p.5) “the problem of piracy is by no means limited to the Gulf of Aden 
and/or the Indian Ocean. Somali pirates have now expanded their operations up to the 
west coast of India. Many analysts believe that the worrying rise in the number of 
attacks off the coast of West Africa will result in the region becoming the next piracy 
hotspot.” Schembri added that these maritime security threats are mounting concerns for 
the safe passage of vessel, cargo and crew through this high-risk area.  
In the literature, there is a consensus that the rate of unlawful acts (crime) against 
vessels in the GoG area has been on the increase in recent years. According to Hart 
(2014, p.3) maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea includes theft, robbery, and assault, 
kidnap and hijack. Hart claimed that between 2008 and 2013, there was a 30% increase 
in overall activity. There are two key trends in the Gulf of Guinea: kidnapping for 
ransom and hijacking for cargo; 355% increase in maritime kidnapping for ransom; and 
12.5% decline in hijacking for cargo incidents. Anyiam (2014) however stated that 
information on the exact nature of such unlawful acts in the region is distorted and 
unreliable with confusing statistics hampering efforts to suppress the menace. Anyiam 
attributed this to confusing definition of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Critical 
assessment of the IMO Regional Analysis of West Africa from 1995 to 2015 on Table 
1, indicated that 80.4% of the reported incidents of unlawful acts against vessels in 
West African (GoG) should be properly and legally classified as armed robbery. These 
statistics seem to prove Anyiam’s claim.  
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Table 1: Extract from regional analysis of reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery 
in West Africa 
LOCATION OF INCIDENT  NUMBER 
In international waters 176 
In territorial waters 312 
In port area 412 
NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK 
 1-4 persons 259 
5-10 persons 234 
More than 10 persons 87 
Not stated 300 
OTHER 
 Lives lost (unit: people) 48 
Wounded crew (unit: people) 183 
Missing crew (unit: people) 10 
Crew hostage (unit: people) 614 
Assaulted (unit: people) 216 
Ransom 0 
TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS REPORTED 900 
Sources: International Maritime Organization (2015, 
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/PAR/Reports.aspx?Name=RegionalAnalysis) 
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It is important to note that Anyiam’s report did not set out to disprove the presence of 
maritime security threats in the GoG. Indeed the report states “it is impossible to have 
an effective solution to a problem without establishing the nature of the problem.”  
Anyiam argue that “in formulating an effective strategy to repress the surge in unlawful 
acts against the safety of maritime navigation in GoG it is vital that we first appreciate 
the exact nature of the problem from a legal perspective.” For any security measure to 
be fruitful in combating crimes against vessels in GoG it must be based on a sound legal 
footing bearing in mind the rights and obligations of states within the various maritime 
zones under UNCLOS with issues relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction, and also the 
various maritime boundary disputes in the region due to the discovery of crude oil. In 
view of this maritime security threats are viewed in this study in relation to Anyiam’s 
concept. Acts of crime done in territorial waters are considered under the jurisdiction of 
the said maritime state whereas those done in international waters are considered as 
such. Piracy for example the IMOs’ definition recognizes a distinction between piracy 
as only occurring in international waters and all other unlawful acts within internal and 
territorial waters and port facilities as armed robbery (Anyiam, 2014).  
3.10 VTMIS and Maritime Security  
 Both (Anyiam,) and (Schembri,) agree that threats of maritime security in the GoG are 
rooted onshore. Issues such as poverty, unemployment, corruption and free access to 
weapons are some of the causes of threats in the GoG. There are many suggestions for 
combating the challenges in maritime security in the GoG area including gaining 
consensus between affected nations and regional cooperation, tackling the root causes 
ashore, enforcing legislation among many other factors. Arguable the use of VTMIS 
will enhance efforts at bringing down the maritime security threats or crime in the GoG. 
According to Anyiam (2014, p.12), “GoG States must invest in modern technology in 
their efforts to combat maritime crime due to the large expanse of the area to be kept 
under surveillance.” He argued that it is possible for states to have virtual control of 
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their maritime domains by investing in various maritime surveillance technologies. 
Anyiam list AIS, LRIT, vessel monitory system, vessel detection system, and VTS as 
examples of available technology for maritime surveillance.  
Apart from the core uses of VTS for Information Service, Traffic Organization Service, 
and Navigational Service the upgrading of a VTS into a VTMIS help governments in 
many ways.  Many agencies such as fisheries, customs, immigrations service, port 
authorities, national intelligence units, the Navy, coast guard, Search and Rescue units 
would be able to utilize information stored and processed for planning, forecasting, as 
well as detecting maritime related crime.  There are many VTS equipment that feed 
information into the VTMIS for analysis. Some of these equipment and how they can be 
used in combating maritime crime are reviewed as follows.  
A VTS Radar (see pictures in Figure 5) is a system for detecting the presence, direction, 
distance, and speed of aircraft, ships, and other objects, by sending out pulses of radio 
waves which are reflected off the object back to the source. According to (International 
Association of Marine Aids, 2012) a VTS radars typically function like a ship’s radar. 
However VTS radar are sometimes customized to operate simultaneously on short and 
long-range identification.  
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Source: (International Association of Marine Aids, 2012, p.81) 
Figure 5: Radar (top Rotherdam-Netherlands, left side: Zandvliet-Belgium, right: 
Genova-Italy) 
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According to IALA, radar is required to be able to detect and track, for subsequent 
display, all specified moving or stationary targets which satisfy the detection criteria 
within the specified coverage areas and during all specified operating circumstances.  
They help in developing vessel traffic images. Plotted radar images allows for presence, 
direction, distance, and speed detection. In the absence of other sophisticated 
equipment, radar offers a rudimentary technic for identifying suspicious targets at sea 
and to take necessary action.  
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is intended as a supporting tool to enhance 
safety of life at sea, the safety and efficiency of navigation, and the protection of the 
marine environment. European Commission (2008, p.7) noted that the AIS is a ship-
borne transponder system designed in the first instance for maritime safety and in 
particular collision avoidance. They are built with a transponder unit including GPS, 
VHF transmitter/ receiver and display / terminal. The vessel AIS broadcasts a message 
at regular intervals containing its identification, position, speed, course plus a number of 
detailed items about the ship and its cargo such as ship length, draft, cargo type, ports of 
providence and destination. To make it very secured, the ship identification (MMSI 
number) and some static data are hardwired into the device. Regulation 19 of Chapter V 
of the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 as amended 
requirement for vessels to have AIS. The benefits to AIS include the automatic identity 
of a vessel’s MMSI or call sign, which helps to facilitate rapid radio communication 
and ships data reception. They provide timely, relevant, and accurate information about 
vessels within the area that might affect safety, security, or the decision-making of a 
VTMIS.  Although some information in the vessel’s AIS can be manipulated and the 
AIS can be switched off, generally together with the radar it still aid in tracking and 
apprehending vessels in time of maritime crime.  
Another important part of a VTMIS is a Long Range Identification and Tracking 
(LRIT) system. European Commission (2008) reports indicates that an LRIT is a 
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messaging system for security and SAR purposes that is regulated by IMO through an 
amendment of SOLAS Chapter V regulation 19. This is a mandatory tool for passenger 
ships, cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and up on international voyages and mobile 
offshore drilling units.  Whereas the AIS device receives information as far as the line 
of sight the LRIT is global through the use of satellite cans. Additionally, LRIT sends 
data to specific recipients for confidential treatment unlike AIS which broadcasts. 
Another handy component of a VTMIS is Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS). This system allows ships to alert authorities on shore as well as other ships 
in case of an emergency. GMDSS equipment includes VHF and MF radio with Digital 
Selective Calling (DSC) facility among others. These identification, tracking, and 
alerting systems facilitate measures aimed at preventing maritime security and crime. 
Some modern VTMIS also integrate satellite facilities to enhance coverage areas.  
According to Professor Dalaklis, Siousiouras, and Nikitakos (2009), the VTMIS in 
Greece elevates the role the country plays above the regional scale and contributes to 
the effective protection of the Greek Seas, with change for policy-makers from 
suppression to prevention. VTS around the world improves the safety and efficiency of 
navigation, safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment and or the 
adjacent shore area, worksites and offshore installations from maritime security threats 
and adverse effects of maritime traffic. Ghana’s VTMIS would be investigated inline 
with these equipment to understand the set-up, capabilities and effectiveness in 
improving maritime safety and security.  
3.11 The Nature of VTS/VTMIS in Ghana 
According to reports published on the commissioning of the VTMIS project by GMA, 
the VTMIS is an integrated system established to enhance continuous electronic 
surveillance of the entire coast of Ghana. Ghana Maritime Authority (2014) reports 
indicated that, under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport, it acquired land for 
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construction of control centres and erection of eleven towers for the coastal and lake 
sites; installed microwave/internet/WAN communication links; acquired frequencies for 
microwave communications, installed hydrological buoys; among others to establish a 
national VTMIS.  
The VTMIS is made up of one national control centre and three area control centres. 
These include National Control Centre (NCC), area West Control Centre (WCC), area 
East Control Centre (ECC), and Navy Head quarters area Control Centre.  GMA reports 
noted that these four control centres are fed with data from twelve remote sites. Eight of 
the twelve remote sites for coastal surveillance are called Remote Sensor Sites (RSS). 
They are located across the coast area of Ghana from east to west at Keta (Woe), Big 
Ada, Tema, Winneba, Cape Coast, Takoradi, Axim, and Epunsa (Half Assini). The 
remaining three remote sites for automatic identification of vessels at Volta Lake are 
called Remote Base Stations (RBS). They are located inland along the banks of the 
Volta Lake at Yeji, Kete Krachi and Anum.    
In all, ten monitoring stations are also fed with information from the four control 
centres. These monitoring stations include National Security, Narcotics Control Board 
(NACOB), Naval Command East, Naval Command West, Ghana Ports and Harbours 
Authority (GPHA), Fisheries Department, Ghana Immigrations Service, Customs and 
Preventive Service (CEPS), Volta Lake Transport Company, Regional Maritime 
University. The physical and logical set-ups of the system are illustrated on Figure 6.  
One of the respondents said, “data from the remote sensor sites in the area east and west 
are fed into WCC and ECC respectively.”  The diagram in Figure 6 (B) illustrated the 
direction of flow of data among the RSS, RBS, and control centres in the system. The 
WCC and ECC intend send the data to the NCC. Navy HQ area control centre gets it 
feed from the NCC. However the three inland RBS feed data direct to the NCC.  
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A: Physical set-up 
B: Logical set-up 
Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2014, p.8 
Figure 6: Overview of NCC and Area Control Centre of Ghana’s VTMIS 
GHANA'SVTMIS 
8 Remote 
Sensor Sites 
3 Remote Base 
Stations 
10 Monitoring 
Stations 
4 CONTROL 
CENTRES 
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A: National Control Centre at GMA HQ 
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B: VTMIS West Control Centre (WCC)      
  
Source: GMA Dairies, 2014 
Figure 7: Control Centres at A: Accra (GMA HQ) and B: Takoradi (WCC) 
3.12 Hardware and Software Components  
The hardware and software component of the VTMIS in Ghana is discussed under 
Control centres, the monitoring station, and the remote sites.  The control centres are all 
equipped with data centres, two Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems 
(GMDSS) VHF Digital Selective Calling (DSC) devices, Workstations and displays, 
and IP-phones. Information received for the RSS and RBS is stored at the data centres 
in databases.  The data centres collate, stores, and process data from the RSS and RBS. 
The workstations and display are used for visualizing, displaying and presenting the 
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information to VTMIS operators (see picture at Figure 8). The operators keep watch on 
24/7 bases on shifts in the control centres. The IP-phones are used for internal 
communication between the control centres, the monitoring stations, and the RSS and 
RBS. The IP-phone enables internal voice-over-IP communication between these sites.  
 Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014) 
Figure 8: Workstations and Display unites at the control centres of the VTMIS in Ghana   
Ghana’s VTMIS centres are equipped with GMDSS devices. According to Inmarsat 
(2015), the IMO adopted GMDSS in 1988 with amendments to SOLAS Chapter IV. 
GMDSS is an international system that uses terrestrial and satellite technology and 
shipboard radio systems to send automated alerting to shore-based communication and 
rescue authorities as well as ships in the immediate vicinity in the event of distress at 
sea. A core component of the GMDSS is the VHF DSC device. DSC is a paging system 
that uses data signals to automate the transmission and reception of calls on VHF 
marine radio channel 70 (see picture at Figure 9).  
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Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014) 
Figure 9: GMDSS (VHF DSC) set at Ghana 
For purposes of redundancy, 50 KVA generators, Uninterruptible Power Supplies 
(UPS), and Automatic Voltage Regulators (AVR) have been installed at all the control 
centres, monitoring stations, RSS and RBS. These centres and sites have been 
networked with fiber optic WAN, Internet, and microwave networks. These ensure that, 
the system runs without interruptions.     
The monitoring stations are equipped with a set of workstation and an IP-phone. The 
workstation receives data from the control centres. These departments put personnel in 
charge to monitor activities depending on their special interests. Every monitoring 
station perform similar operations as the control centres except that, the features and 
functions are limited to the use of a monitoring station. They monitor vessel traffic and 
can use IP-phones to communicate with control centres for detail information that may 
not be available to them.   A picture of the equipment setup in one of the monitoring 
stations is at Figure 10.  
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 Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014) 
Figure 10: Equipment setup at Ghana’s VTMIS Monitoring Stations  
The RSS and RBS are equipped with Radars scanners, CCTVs, weather sensors, VHS 
and AIS antennas, and microwave communication disc. These equipments are mounted 
on a 15 metres towers. A picture of one of the towers and equipment is at Figure 11. 
The RSS and RBS also have communication devices that send the data from the above 
devices to the data centres at control centres. The shelter that contains the 
communication devices also have IP-phones in them to allow officers at the sites to 
communicate with personnel at the control centres. 
With regards to hardware component, the VTMIS in Ghana is impressive. It is yet to be 
integrated with satellite technologies that can extend it and increase the coverage area. 
however, with the right procedures and personnel, the system can be used to conduct 
effective surveillance along the GoG area.   
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Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2014, p.12 
Figure 11:  Equipment at the VTMIS RSS and RBS 
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3.13 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed related literature on use of VTS and VTMIS. It discussed the 
history of VTS and evolution to VTMIS. IMO guidelines and legislation setting 
requirements for establishing and operating VTS were also reviewed. The establishment 
of coastal surveillance system emerged in the 1950s to aid navigation and enhance 
safety at sea.  Eventually in 1985, IMO came out with resolution A.578(14) on 
guidelines for vessel traffic service and revised it in 1997 as  A.578(14) to further 
strengthen measures aimed at improving safety and efficiency in movement of maritime 
traffic. This resolution also contains the definitions of concepts and terms used in the 
VTS domain. Regulation 12, chapter V of the SOLAS convention included 
requirements for governments that established VTS.   
Based on a model attributed to Wiersma et.al (as cited in Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014), 
VTS components are put under three main groups. These include people/personnel, 
procedures, and hardware/software. A well-organized VTMIS system should have all 
these components developed and functioning as required. In the discussion that follows 
in chapter four, Ghana’s VTMIS would be evaluated in light of these components to test 
its strengths in improving safety, security and protection of maritime environment. 
Maritime security is a difficult term to define. As such the concept is seen as a 
buzzword and attached to different meanings in the literature. A study of this nature 
however needed a delimited meaning to what constitute maritime security or crime. 
This will enable the study to easily identify unlawful acts or crimes in the GoG. The 
study reviewed the work of (Bueger, 2014) on maritime security. Although Bueger 
proposed three frameworks, by semiotics, securitization, and security practice theory, to 
defining maritime security, the study adopted only the semiotic framework for defining 
maritime security. This framework related maritime security to four concepts: seapower, 
marine safety, blue economy, and human resilience. However, seapower was left out 
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because its inclusion would take the study out of context. Applying the MSM of Bueger 
maritime security is used in this study to refer to the presence of issues such as maritime 
accidents, pollution, smuggling, piracy, robbery, IUU fishing, and human trafficking in 
the maritime domain. 
A review of IMO data and (Hurt, 2014) on piracy and armed robbery revealed reported 
cases in the GoG area. According Professor (Dalaklis, 2012), many analysts believe that 
the worrying rise in the number of attacks off the coast of West Africa will result in the 
region becoming the next piracy hotspot. Hart (2014) stated that between 2008 and 
2013, there was a 30% increase in overall activity. Anyiam agreed to the presence of 
threats to maritime security in the GoG area but noted that the confusing definition of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea for example is partly to blame for the alarming reports 
of such cases in the GoG area. This study adopted Anyian’s concept of identifying 
maritime security threats with regards to whether they are done within a jurisdiction of 
high seas.   
VTS/VTMIS have evolved to become very sophisticated today. VTMIS now include a 
wide range of devices such as advanced Radars, AIS equipment, LRIT databases, 
GMDSS systems and satellite integrations.  These additions have further enhanced 
VTS/VTMIS usage around the world to improve safety and efficiency of navigation, 
safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment. Following in chapter 
four, Ghana’s VTMIS is investigated inline with these new technology to understand its 
capabilities and effectiveness in improving maritime safety and security especially in 
the countries jurisdiction and in the GoG area at large.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSIONS ON THE ROLE OF VTMIS AND MARITIME SECURITY IN 
GULF OF GUINEA AREA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses results from primary qualitative data collected from interviews 
conducted via Google Docs forms, emails, and phone calls of staff from the Ghana 
Maritime Authority (GMA) and other state agencies that uses the VTMIS facility in 
Ghana. The discussion also used secondary data from publication of the GMA on the 
VTMIS project. In addition secondary data on regional piracy and armed robbery from 
the IMO website and maritime crime data from (Hart, 2014) is included in the 
discussion. The discussion is put under four themes namely, the set-up of Ghana’s 
VTMIS; contributions of VTMIS to protecting offshore installations; usefulness of 
VTMIS in combating crime in the GoG; and the shortfalls of Ghana’s VTMIS.   
The first theme discusses the nature of the three VTS components of Ghana’s VTMIS. 
It looks at the hardware and software equipment integrated, the coverage area; the 
personnel operating the facility; and the procedures (guidelines and regulations) 
governing the system. The second theme discusses the role Ghana’s VTMIS play in 
securing offshore installations. This section looks at specific state or private facilities 
and how they are being protected by the VTMIS system. The third theme, discusses the 
role Ghana’s VTMIS play in fighting maritime crime. The section identifies particular 
crimes or unlawful acts at sea according to Bueger semiotic framework and discusses a 
technology in the VTMIS that can help combat the threat. The fourth theme discusses 
the shortfalls of Ghana’s VTMIS. Based on the discussion preceding this section, an 
evaluation of the countries VTMIS is possible in relation to current technology and 
capabilities of VTMIS in the world.  
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4.2 The Components of VTMIS in Ghana  
To help understand further the composition of the components of the VTMIS in Ghana 
and to add to what has already been discussed in the literature, questions on the 
hardware and software components, the operational procedures, and training 
requirements of VTMIS personnel were added to the interview guide. On personnel 
development, the participants were asked the following questions: “what is your 
background?” and “what are the training requirements for VTS staff?” All the 
participants involved in the interviews from GMA were either Marine Radio Officers or 
Merchant Captains. They had worked on vessels as radio officers or as masters for some 
years. They all stated that IALA training and certification was required for VTMIS 
operators. All participants had gone through training as VTS operators according to the 
IALA VTS 103 modules.  
The participants from other government agencies had past experiences in Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) and others were just new officers recruited and 
trained purposely to work at the monitoring stations. Unlike the VTMIS personnel at 
GMA, the personnel from other agencies did not have training on VTS operation as 
required by IALA and IMO regulations. This is because they are only responsible for 
manning monitoring stations, which are not operated like VTS centres but merely for 
monitoring purposes. It is only in the three control centres, the NCC, WCC, and ECC 
that VTS assistance is provided for.  However, all the participants from GMA and the 
other government agencies had been formally taken through the “JMAP” software used 
for the monitoring of vessels.     
When the participants were asked whether there are regulations which VTMIS 
authorities are expected to comply?  The responses revealed that the VTMIS is expected 
to be regulated by requirements of the IMO, Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE), and International Telecommunication Union (ITU). IMO legislation 
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such as in SOLAS Chapter V, regulation 12 and guidelines contained in the Resolution 
A.857 (20). The IEEE define standards for communication data between electronic 
devices and whilst the ITU is a special UN agency that standardizes ICT technology 
such as wireless technologies, aeronautical and maritime navigation, radio astronomy, 
satellite-based meteorology, convergence in fixed-mobile phone, Internet access, among 
many others.  
The percipients from GMA were all able to give a general structure of the nature of 
VTMIS in Ghana. One interviewer said “there are four control centres namely, Area 
West, Area East, Central, and the Navy. Area West and Area East feed data into the 
national HQ at central control centre. The VTMIS covers the entire coast of Ghana and 
the inland Volta lake.” Another participant from GMA said the VTMIS is made up of  
“4 control centers, 8 remote sites, 3 AIS bases, and 10 monitoring centers. The data 
centres at the control centers stores information received for the RSS and RBS. The 
database software backup and process the information for consumption. The operators 
monitor and keep watch on Ghana’s maritime domain using the workstations and 
displays in the control centres. 
However, when participants were asked to list government agencies that benefited from 
the VTMIS and the nature of information they received from the system, the story was 
different. All respondents listed some other agencies apart from their own that are 
linked up to the system. Apparently, GMA had organized training sessions on the use of 
the software and other operational regulations for the operators of the monitoring 
station.  
All the participants from GMA again were well vested in knowledge about the 
hardware components of VTMIS. Participants were asked two major questions on 
hardware components during the interviews. These include “What are the 
communication mediums used in the VTMIS to contact and communicate with vessels 
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and between VTS centres? Also list the various sensor devise integrated” and “How far 
in terms of nautical miles is the coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS?”  The 
communication devices listed included AIS, VHF/DSC, and IP-phone. AIS texting and 
VHF/DSC are used for communicating with vessels whereas IP-phone are used for 
internal communication.  
The sensors listed include AIS antennas, CCTV, Radar, Hydrological sensors, and 
weather sensors. The participants said that the eight RSS and three RBS are each 
equipped with Radar scanner, VHF antenna, AIS antenna, weather sensors, 
Hydrological sensors, and CCTV cameras. These devices are mounted on 55 metres 
steel towers. The Radar is used for scanning vessels. Particularly the radars aid in 
identifying vessel which have their AIS switched off or do not have them fitted at all. 
The coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS Radars is 50 nautical miles offshore. The 
advantage of the radar also includes its ability to determine course (direction) and 
speed. GMA participants also said the CCTV capture and feed close proximity videos to 
the system for monitoring areas around the ports.  With the CCTV the system is able to 
view areas closed to the sensor sites for up to 15 nautical miles. The AIS devices pick 
signals from vessels fitted with AIS transponders and LRIT is able to track vessels in 
many parts of the world. A participant summed up the coverage areas by these devices 
as follows “LRIT - 1000 nm, AIS - 300 nm, Radar - 90 nm, and CCTV - 14 nm.” As 
discussed in the literature, Ghana’s VTMIS also included a GMDSS set. The GMDSS 
(VHF DSC) set are for communicating with vessels via broadcast and on designated 
channels. The GMDSS is used to receive alerts from vessels in distress so that the 
appropriate action can be taken.   
With all these communication devices and data sensors Ghana’s system has the required 
technology and expertise to run a well functioning VTMIS. The interviews revealed that 
the VTMIS operators from GMA are trained according to IALA recommended course 
VTS 103. It also revealed that the VTMIS authorities are aware and operate the system 
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in Ghana in accordance with procedures, legislation, guidance and standardization from 
international organizations such as the IMO and IALA, ITU, and IEEE. On hardware, 
the interviews revealed that the VTMIS in Ghana has the basic infrastructure necessary 
for conducting descent surveillance on safety and maritime security in the GoG area. 
4.3 VTMIS contribution to Security of Offshore installations in Ghana 
The first sub-objective of the study was to investigate how VTS can contribute to the 
increase security level of offshore installations.  Some of the interview questions were 
therefore designed to aid the study investigated and the role VTMIS play in protecting 
offshore installations such as cables, oilrigs, and pipelines in Ghana. Reviewing the 
development of VTS, it was indicated that, the primary reason for its development was 
to ensure navigational safety. However, maritime safety is far broader than just 
navigational safety. According to IALA VTS Manual, traffic surveillance systems were 
simply made of shore-based radar combined with VHF radio to enhance real-time 
information exchange between the shore and ships for navigational purposes. According 
to (Bueger, 2014) maritime safety includes the regulation of the construction of vessels 
and maritime installations, the regular control of their safety procedures as well as the 
education of maritime professionals in complying with regulations.  
With developments in technology that allows for resources in remote areas in the sea to 
be explored, there has been the need for many installations in the maritime industry. In 
Ghana, there are installations at the Salt-pound and Jubilee oil fields for exploration and 
drilling of crude oil. In addition to resources explorations, many countries have installed 
pipelines to transport water, gas, or crude oil to processing units shore based. The West 
Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) and the gas pipeline linking FPSO Kwame Nkrumah to 
the processing units at Takoradi are examples of pipeline maritime installations in the 
coastal waters of Ghana. Internet revolutions have also led to many telecommunication 
companies running their communication cables through the sea. Main One, MTN, and 
 58 
Glo all have communication cables running across the GoG linking countries of West 
Africa to the rest of the World. 
In connection with this sub objective to investigate how the VTMIS in Ghana 
contributes to increase security level of offshore installations such as cables, pipe lines, 
and oil rigs, the participants were first asked to state the usefulness of the VTMIS to 
Ghana and the West African sub-region. This was meant to test general theoretical 
knowledge of the possible uses of VTMIS in Ghana and West African region. One of 
the participants called said the VTMIS could be used for: 
“Safety of navigation, prevention of vessels from entering restricted areas, control 
of vessels around subsea structures, anti piracy controls, anti pollution controls, 
vessel reporting system controls, narcotics control, aid to search and rescue, and 
inland water safety at the Volta lake.“ 
Another participant said the system is used for: 
“For ensuring security at national protected areas like the oil fields, protecting 
private communication cables installed in through the sea, protecting the West 
African Gas Pipeline, and giving information to vessels along the coast of Ghana. 
There is also collaboration with the navy in identifying vessels patrolling in 
unfitting zones and vessels that may be suspected to be violating any maritime 
regulation. Basically, the VTMIS offices keep watch across the maritime area of 
Ghana to ensure safety and security.” 
Based on the responses, it can be said that generally the awareness of the uses of the 
VTMIS is high. Although the first respondent quoted above was more general, 
evidently the statements of the second respondent indicated that the participants were 
mostly listing what the system was being used for. The participant use of statements 
such as “we also collaborate with the navy in identifying vessels patrolling in unfitting 
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zones and vessels that may be suspected to be violating any maritime regulation” and 
“we basically keep watch across the maritime area of Ghana to ensure safety and 
security” both reflect involvement. This shows a state of involvement and what is being 
done rather than mere listing of what could be done.  
The investigation further asked participants to state the targeted areas during VTMIS 
operations?  If indeed the VTMIS was being used for protecting offshore installations 
then, those areas would be given a certain level of protection and identified for example 
as restricted zones, no anchorage zone, or no fishing zones. The responses revealed that 
the West African Gas Pipeline, Main One Sub Sea communication cables, Atuabo gas 
pipeline, Area-To-Be-Avoided near the FPSO, western oil fields, and areas around the 
national oil fields, are all targeted areas during operations.  
The interviewees were also asked to explain how VTS could be used to provide security 
monitoring of offshore installations. In the words of one participant, they do so by:  
“Keeping watch 24-7 on Areas-To-Be-Avoided, and demarcated no anchorage 
zones. Operators’ advice vessels to keep off protected areas and offshore 
installations. Vessels are also advised not to anchor closed to pipelines and 
communication cables. In addition, port authorities watch and advice vessels 
appropriately.”  
The display show tracks of vessels by radar and AIS and operators are able to see and 
advice vessels to keep off such areas.  Broadcast messages as well as AIS messages 
enable VTMIS centres to communicate with vessels to ensure such areas are protected. 
Fishing activities in exclusive zones such as the Jubilee oil fields are also monitored and 
vessel in such areas are adviced to keep off.  
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4.4 Protection of the West African Gas Pipeline  
The interviews revealed that West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) is one of the targeted 
offshore installation that the VTMIS is used to protect. A protection area is created 
along the portion of the pipeline that runs on Ghanaian waters. The WAGP is a 678 km 
gas pipeline that runs across coastal countries in the GoG. The pipeline delivers purified 
natural gas for fuel for power plants and industrial applications. WAPCO (2015) report 
stated that, WAGP links into the Escravos-Lagos pipeline at the Itoki Natural Gas 
Export Terminal in Nigeria. The pipeline then runs offshore from Lagos Nigeria to 
Takoradi in Ghana. The West Africa Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCO) owns 
and operates the WAGP.  
Between Lagos and Takoradi, there are three laterals extending from the WAGP to 
Cotonou in Benin, Lome in Togo, and Tema in Ghana. The lengths of the laterals are as 
follows: Cotonou 7 nautical miles (13 Km), Lome 10.3 nautical miles (19 Km), 
Tema 7.8 nautical miles (14 Km) (WAPCO, 2015). According to WAPCO, the average 
water depth of the pipeline is varied. The average depth at sections offshore Ghana is 35 
metres. Along the Ghana coast, the closest range is 3.5 nautical miles (6.5 kilometers) 
south of Cape St. Paul. The widest range is south of Winneba at 17.5 nautical miles 
(32.5 kilometers). The dimensions of the WAGP are as follows: the main pipeline is 20 
inches in diameter; Cotonou lateral is 8 inches, Lome lateral is 8 inches; while the Tema 
lateral is 18 inches. The termination point at Takoradi (Aboadzi) forms part of the main 
pipeline (see picture at Figure 12).  
WAPCO (2015) report indicated that, activities which constitute potential risk to 
offshore WAGP damage include but not limited to: anchoring; ship Anchor Drag and 
trawl board impact; bottom trawling; and Illegal Fishing methods such as use of 
dynamite. Others include; mining including sand winning; construction; and any 
activity that risk the chance of making physical contact with the sea bed within the zone 
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and involves a risk of damaging the pipeline. The WAGP is very important to Ghana’s 
economy and national security because it supplies fuel to the Thermal Power Plant at 
Takoradi (Aboadzi) and Sunon Asogli in Tema. Any damage to the pipeline has the 
ability to affect gas supply and power supply to Ghanaians. 
Source: Ghana Oil Watch, 2013 (http://ghanaoilwatch.org/index.php/ghana-oil-and-gas-
news/3225-gas-pipeline-95-complete-nigeria-to-resume-supply-in-days-energy-
minister) 
Figure 12: The West Africa Gas Pipeline 
According to (WAPCO, 2015) the West African Gas Pipeline suffered a catastrophic 
loss of containment in early 2007 due, apparently, to damage by a ship's anchor. 
Similarly, the Ghanaian Chronicle, a prominent newspaper in Ghana reported that in 
August 2012, the WAGP was damaged by the anchor of a ship that was trying to avoid 
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a pirate attack. Ghanaian Chronicles (2015) stated that, Aboadzi and Sunon Asogli 
thermal power plants supply 580 megawatts about 32.5 per cent of electricity to Ghana. 
The VTMIS monitoring of the WAGP is therefore significant contribution to national 
security.  
 
 
4.5 Protection of the Oil Fields and Private cables 
Apart from the WAGP the interviews also noted the Atuabo gas pipeline, Area-To-Be-
Avoided near the FPSO, western Jubilee oil fields and salt-pound oil fields are all 
targeted areas during operations. Just like the WAGP, these areas are monitored 24/7 at 
the VTMIS control centres to ensure vessels navigate safely without destroying the 
exclusive zones. There is an Area-To-Be-Avoided along the FPSO Kwame Nkrumah 
(picture in Figure 13). The Oil fields are national assets and vessels seen loitering 
around any filed without permit can be apprehended and questioned. Fishing vessels are 
also adviced to keep off exclusive zones. Last but not the least, the responses indicated 
that Main One Sub Sea communication cables are also being monitored. Main One is 
one of the first private companies in Ghana to have their cables charted and monitored 
by the VTMIS project.  How the system could further be developed to increase it usage 
is discussed under shortfalls in proceeding section.  
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Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014, 16) 
Figure 13: Screen shots of the Jubilee field coverage showing the FPSO and other 
Vessels  
 
4.6 Fighting Maritime Crime in the GoG with VTMIS    
The second specific objective is to access how VTMIS capabilities are integrated in the 
effort to fight against crime in the GoG. There was the need to define the parameters of 
maritime security and therefore maritime crime. According to (Bueger, 2014), maritime 
security is a major threat to international shipping in the world today. Therefore 
international organizations such as NATO, the AU, and the EU among others have 
integrated maritime security strategies aimed at combating threats in the sea. However, 
because security actors significantly diverge over how they draw relationships and 
position threats within them, there are varied definitions of maritime security. Bueger’s 
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MSM is applied in defining maritime security as it relates to maritime safety, blue 
economy and human resilience. In this study it refers to the presence of issues such as 
maritime accidents, pollution, smuggling, piracy, robbery, IUU fishing, and human 
trafficking, in the GoG. These maritime security threats are also collectively called 
crime in this study. The focus is on the role VTMIS play in fighting these and other 
maritime threats that relates to maritime safety, blue economy, and human resilience.   
4.7 Data on Maritime Crime  
In Africa, the problem of piracy is not limited to the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, according to 
Professor Dalaklis, many analysts believe that the worrying rise in the number of 
attacks off the coast of West Africa will result in the region becoming the next piracy 
hotspot (Professor Dalaklis, 2012). According to Allianz Global Corporate and 
Specialty (2015) there were 59 total losses between 2005 and 2015 that occurred at the 
GoG. Their report defined total losses as actual total losses or constructive total losses 
recorded for vessels of 100 gross tons or over (excluding for example pleasure craft and 
smaller vessels) as at the time of the analysis.  
Data gathered from the Ghana Maritime Authority during the interviews revealed that 
with regards to piracy and armed robbery, a total of 33 incidents occurred in 2014 as 
compared to 20 incidents in 2015. All the incidents in 2014 happened between January 
and August, between the same periods in 2015, the total number of incidents dropped to 
20 representing 39.4 per cent decrement.  
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Table 2: Incidents of Piracy in 2014 and 2015 in the GoG 
2014 
INCIDENT  JAN  FEB  MAR  APR  MAY JUN JUL AUG TOTAL  
Hijacked  1  0  1  0  0 2 1 0 5  
Boarded  2  3  1  1  2 1 0 5 15  
Attempt  0  2  2  1  1 1 0 3 10 
Suspicious 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Total  3  5 4  3  3 5 2 8 33  
2015 
INCIDENT  JAN  FEB  MAR  APR MAY JUN JUL AUG TOTAL  
Hijacked   2 0  0    0 0  0 0 0  2 
Boarded   1 0  6    1 3  1 0 0 12 
Attempt   0  2  0    2 1  0 0 0  5 
Suspicious  1 0 0   0 0  0 0 0  1  
Total   4  2 6    3           4  1 0 0 20    
Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2015 
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Table 3: Piracy in the GoG by country in 2014 and 2015 
2014 
COUNTRY  JA
N  
FE
B  
MA
R  
APR  MA
Y 
JU
NE 
JUL AUG TOTA
L  
Angola  1  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 
Congo  0  2  1  0  0 0 0 3 6  
Gabon  1  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1  
Liberia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nigeria  0  3  3  3  1 1 0 3 14  
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 
I.Coast 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 
S. Leone 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Togo 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total  3  5  4  3  3 5 2 8 33  
2015 
COUNTRY  JA
N  
FE
B  
MA
R  
APR MA
Y 
JU
N 
JUL
Y 
AUG TOTA
L  
Nigeria   1 2   4   1  2   0 0 0  10 
Ghana  2 0  0   0  0   0 0 0   2 
I.Coast  1 0  1   0  0   0 0 0   2 
Guinea   0 0  0   2  1   0 0 0   3 
Congo  0 0  1   0  1   1 0 0   3 
Total   4 2   6   3  4   1 0 0  20 
Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2015.  
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According to the European Union (2015) the International Maritime Bureau figures of 
the GoG accounted for 18 per cent in 2013 and 16 per cent in 2014, of attacks 
worldwide. Although about 80 per cent of these crimes against ships have taken place in 
territorial waters, trends over the last couple of years shows a shift towards such 
incidents occurring on the high seas and with a wider geographical spread further West 
and South. Information on the incidents reported is varied. This is often attributed to 
underreporting. Nonetheless, there is justifiable evidence that piracy and armed robbery 
are on the increase in the GoG area.  
According to the EJF (2012, p.4), “West African waters are estimated to have the 
highest levels of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in the world.” The 
EU report noted that IUU represents up to 37 per cent of the region's catch costing 
coastal states around $1.3 billion per year. According to  (European Commission, 2015, 
p.8) trafficking and smuggling drugs, humans, and arms with related money-laundering, 
also continues to grow across porous land and sea borders in West Africa, taking 
advantage of continuing insecurity notably in the Sahel, and in other countries. 
Evidently, maritime crime is on the increase in the GoG area.  
Piracy anti pollution control, and narcotic control were among many factors the 
participants listed under the usefulness of the VTMIS to Ghana and the West African 
sub-region. As already discussed in previous section a participant said that VTMIS is 
useful for “safety of navigation, prevention of vessels from entering restricted areas, 
control of vessels around subsea structures, anti piracy controls, anti pollution controls, 
vessel reporting system controls, narcotics control, aid to search and rescue, and inland 
water safety at the Volta lake.” Asked specifically to state the role of VTMIS in 
ensuring maritime security in Ghana, a participant said:  
“VTMIS is a surveillance system that informs the appropriate authorities what to 
do. GMA collaborate with Ghana navy to check on vessels that are suspected to 
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be undertaking activities that causes threats to Ghana's maritime security. With 
the VHF, vessels can report to the VTMIS when they are attacked by pirates.”  
Some participant also said that the GMDSS set provide vessels the ability to notify 
control centres and the Navy anytime they are in distress situation including attacks by 
pirates and armed robbers at sea.  
Participants were further asked specifically, how VTMIS could be integrated in the 
fight against crime in the GoG. It was revealed that, the system allows “sharing of data 
between relevant GoG agencies” and “effective exchange of information being the 
VTMIS and enforcement units.” A participant noted in the Google Docs form that: 
“Vessels that disable their AIS but are identified by the radar are checked; vessels 
that stay in closed location for many hours are also checked; and vessels reported 
to have been involved in crime in neighboring countries are monitored and 
reported to the Ghana Navy when they appear within her jurisdiction. Other 
maritime administrations are informed of vessels that violate maritime regulations 
and leave Ghana's maritime domain for interdiction in other countries. In addition, 
government security agencies can plan based on the vessel traffic data over the 
months that VTMIS offer for necessary actions to improve security. CCTV 
cameras locate vessels in close proximity and some details are identified. 
Smuggling and offloading illegal substances into smaller boats can be seen 
therefor the necessary actions taken; and vessels fishing in restricted areas 
identified and advised or apprehended.”    
 The responses therefore revealed that, Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in 
monitoring and reporting issues under maritime crime in the GoG area. This finding 
confirms what the EU recommended for action in the “EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 
2015-2020.” According to the EU, the VTMIS in Ghana is  one of the good national 
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level examples already existing which enables access to information on cargo, namely 
dangerous or polluting ones, transiting or calling at ports (European Union, 2015). 
4.8 Shortfalls of the VTMIS in Ghana  
The advantages and contributions of the VTMIS in Ghana are many; however the 
system could be upgraded further to increase its usability. Participants were asked to list 
the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool. They were also to explain how such 
shortfalls could be removed from the system. Participants noted that, the VTMIS system 
basically monitor and report and that it lacks the power to enforce regulations. Most of 
the information communicated to vessels is given with soft message markers such as 
“advice” or “information.” Ghana has no Coast Guard Centre so only the Navy and 
Search and Rescue units are informed when vessel is suspected to be violating national 
or international regulations. The VTMIS in Ghana therefor lacks the power to enforce. 
According to one participant,  
“When vessels do not comply with regulations; when AIS is switched off; when 
LRIT data is absent; and when calls to vessels are not replied, VTMIS must be 
empowered to sanction offenders.”  
A follow up questions on the limitations in the use of VTS as a monitoring tool revealed 
that separation of enforcement unit from monitoring system also prolongs responses to 
incidents. 
Another shortfall is the coverage ranges of the sensor equipment. The coverage areas of 
equipment such as the CCTV, Radars, and AIS are currently 14Nm, 90NM, and 300NM 
respectively. These could be extended by mounting and integrating equipment on patrol 
boats.  
One participant stated that: 
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“If the CCTV could be extended to cover long Nautical miles, it would be very 
useful. Some countries have added satellite communications to their VTMIS, if 
our system was also integrated to a satellite, we would have better and wider 
coverage than we have now. Ghana also needs a Coast Guard unit to work 
together with the VTMIS to patrol out maritime waters. Coast guard would 
release the navy to play their duty as a national naval force. Patrol boats would 
also allow the SAR centre to contact vessels as soon as identified to be in 
distress.”  
Finally, it was also revealed, that closer collaboration among maritime administrations 
along the GoG would enhance effective monitoring and reporting. The VTMIS in 
Ghana has the ability to extend monitoring of the WAGP beyond Ghana. If there were 
collaboration among West African countries, the usefulness of the system would 
improve.   
4.9 Conclusion  
The great majority of participants stated that IALA training and certification was 
required for VTMIS operators. All VTMIS operators had been trained as VTS operators 
according to the IALA VTS 103 modules. The coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS is as 
follows; LRIT - 1000 nm, AIS - 300 nm, Radar - 90 nm, and CCTV - 14 nm.  
 
Participants said the targeted areas during operation include: West African Gas Pipeline, 
Main One Sub Sea communication cables, Atuabo gas pipeline, Area-To-Be-Avoided 
near the FPSO, western oil fields, and areas around the national oil fields.   
There is justifiable evidence that piracy and armed robbery are on the increase in 
the GoG area. The interviews revealed Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in 
monitoring and reporting issues under maritime crime in the GoG area. GMA 
collaborate with Ghana navy to check on vessels that are suspected to be undertaking 
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activities that are threats to Ghana's maritime security. The system also allows sharing 
of data between relevant GoG agencies and effective exchange of information among 
the VTMIS and enforcement units. Additionally, government security agencies can plan 
based on the vessel traffic data from the VTMIS. 
 
A major shortfall in Ghana’s VTMIS is lack of power to enforce regulation. As such, 
information is communicated to the Navy and Search and Rescue units for appropriate 
action. Another shortfall is the coverage range of the sensor equipment. The coverage 
areas could be extended by mounting and integrating equipment on patrol boats. 
Finally, it was also revealed that, collaboration among maritime administrations along 
the GoG would enhance effective monitoring and reporting.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section summarizes all the important findings, conclusions and recommendations 
of the study. The research was set out to assess the role of VTMIS in enhancing 
maritime security in the GoG area and specifically to: investigate how it contributes to 
the increase security level of offshore installations; access how its capabilities are 
integrated in the effort to fight against crime in the GoG; and finally to identify short 
falls in its use.  Participants were drawn from the VTMIS unit of the GMA and 
government departments where monitoring stations are installed for interviews. The 
discussion in the previous chapter was done based on the responses of the participants 
to the interview questions. The data was discussed in line with the sub objectives of the 
study. The rest of the chapter presents the findings and make recommendations for 
policy makers and other researchers.  
5.1 Findings 
From the discussion of the qualitative data collected and reviews of secondary data 
from the GMA and IMO on maritime incidents in the GoG, the following findings were 
revealed: 
1. The study revealed that VTMIS personnel of Ghana were trained according to 
IALA VTS 103 modules and the system is being operated as required by IMO 
and IALA guidelines for VTS.  
2. The VTMIS in Ghana contributes to the increase security level of the West 
African Gas Pipeline, Main One Sub Sea communication cables, Atuabo gas 
pipeline, Area-To-Be-Avoided near the FPSO, Salt pound oil fields.  
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3. Maritime crime such as piracy, armed robbery, and smuggling are on the 
increase in the GoG region and the same post threats to vessels and seafarers. 
According to (European Commission, 2015) 
4. Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in monitoring and reporting maritime 
security issues in the GoG area.. 
5. It was revealed that a major shortfall in Ghana’s VTMIS is the lack of power to 
enforce regulation effectively. 
6. The study also concluded that future expansion in the range and coverage area 
of the equipment is necessary for better and wider monitory and reporting.  
7. Finally, it was revealed that lack of collaboration among maritime 
administrations in West Africa limits the VTMIS usability in enhancing 
effective monitoring and reporting beyond Ghana’s maritime jurisdiction.     
 
5.2 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made based on the findings and conclusions of the 
study: 
1. The responses indicated that, apart from VTMIS operators from the GMA, staff 
of the monitoring stations were only taken through JMAP software. The study 
recommends that such staff should also be trained with IALA VTS 103 course 
so they can fully appreciate and understand the procedures and data received.  
2. The responses revealed that, Main One was the only privately owned company 
to have their Sub Sea communication cables monitored by the VTMIS in Ghana. 
The study recommends for other private sector companies to utilize the system 
to ensure their offshore infrastructure is protected.   
3. Although the VTMIS is used to monitor and report on suspected maritime 
security threats issues, it is recommended for crew on board vessels to 
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communicate sufficient information to the control centres in times of distress to 
enable prompt assistance to be provided.    
4. The study proposed for the VTMIS to be used by port authorities to organize 
traffic at the two major ports in Ghana (Tema and Takoradi).  
5. The study put forward the idea that, GMA should seek collaboration from 
external funding organizations such as the EU who have interest in curtailing the 
increasing piracy and other maritime security threats in the GoG. This will 
enable the Authority to extend the range and coverage area of the system for 
better monitoring.  
6. IMO regulations mandate vessels to comply with regulations of VTS areas that 
are recognized by IMO. Therefore GMA must strictly enforce navigational 
regulations in its VTMIS areas.  
7.    Collaboration among maritime countries in the GoG region is necessary to 
combat the ever-increasing maritime security threats in the GoG. The study 
recommends maritime Security Council of West African nations to act swiftly to 
increase cooperation.  
8. Other West African maritime nations are recommended to install and operate 
VTMIS units to ensure the entire GoG region is covered. This would 
significantly increase monitoring and reporting across the region.  
9. The study recommends for future researchers to dig more into benefits of the 
VTMIS data to monitoring stations. 
10. Further research by the GMA is also needed in the area of operations to 
understand how successful the VTMIS project has been since its inauguration. 
The research and development should form an integral part of the project.   
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APPENDIX 
 
VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE AS A MARITIME SECURITY TOOL: VESSEL 
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS (VTMIS) IN GHANA 
Participants Consent Form 
The role of the participant  
This dissertation is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree 
of  Master of Science (MSc) degree at the World Maritime University. The study 
intends to investigate the role of VTMIS in Ghana as a security tool that can effectively 
assist in the fight against crime in the Gulf of Guinea region. Participants will be 
engaged in 30-minute interviews about the operations and usefulness of the VST to help 
me collect data for my investigation.  
Participation and Confidentiality of data 
Should you agree to participate, be informed that participation is not obligatory and you 
are free to withdraw from the study at any point you may wish to do so.  The data gather 
for the investigation will be treated as confidential. In addition, anonymity of all 
respondents will be preserved. The interviews will be tap-recorded. I Joseph Akwasi 
Kuma or the World Maritime University (WMU) may retain the data gather in the 
interviews for up to five years after the completion of the study.      
Participants will not be paid for participating in these interviews. There is no anticipated 
risk of physical or emotional injury.   
Consent Statement  
I have read and understood the information and I agree to take part in the study. By this 
agreement, I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information 
sheet, being used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data 
relating to volunteers is held and processed in the strictest confidence. 
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Participant’s Name      Signature  
 
…………………………………   …………………… 
 
Date:…………………………. 
 
 
VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE AS A MARITIME SECURITY TOOL: 
VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
(VTMIS) IN GHANA 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR GHANA MARITIME AUTHORITY VTMIS STAFF 
  
1. What is your background?  
2. Could you take me through the general set-up of the VTS system in 
Ghana? (In terms of infrastructure).   
3. What are the usefulness of the VTMIS to Ghana and the West African sub-
region? 
4. Are there other government agencies that benefit from the VTMIS? (if so 
list them and the nature of information they receive from VTMIS) 
5. Are there targeted areas during VTMIS operations?   
6. What are the communication mediums used in the VTMIS to contact and 
communicate with vessels?  
7. How far in terms of nautical miles is the coverage area of Ghana’s 
VTMIS? 
8. How can VTS be used to provide security monitoring of offshore 
installations? 
9. What is the role of VTMIS in maritime security? 
10. How can VTS be integrated in the fight against crime in the GoG?  
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11. What are the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool and how can 
they be removed?  
12. What are the limitations in the use of VTS as a monitoring tool?  
 
 
 
